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Abstract 
The reconstruction of stable political order after violent conflict is a central concern of 
peacebuilding theory and practice. While much of the literature on this subject is based on cases 
where there has been state collapse or international intervention, this paper draws on a case 
study from India’s north-east, where a long-standing separatist insurgency has given way to a 
stable and protracted ceasefire. Drawing on fieldwork from Ukhrul district in the India-Myanmar 
border, the paper studies the parallel military structures and civilian governance institutions and 
the nature of their interaction. In doing so, it evaluates the consequences of the ceasefire 
political equilibrium in terms of the larger project of conflict resolution and a permanent 
political resolution.  
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1. Introduction 
At first glance, Ukhrul appears to be just another one of the 707 administrative districts in India. 
With a population of 184,000 (2011 census) and territory of 4,544 sq km1, it is governed under 
the modular structure of India’s district level administration. But when talking of the 
government in Ukhrul, there is often confusion about who is being referred to. Alongside the 
formal institutions of the Indian government, is the ‘people’s government’, who, in the words 
of one respondent ‘run everything here’. In the heart of Ukhrul town, not far from the 
administrative offices of the Indian central government and the state government of Manipur is 
the regional office of the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland/Nagalim (GPRN), 
run by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah), which also contains a prison 
cell where offenders can be detained. As one of the GPRN’s Kilonsers (ministers) described it, 
‘We collect the taxes to feed armed cadres and run the administration. We run the people’s 
government’.2 
 
The reconstruction of stable political order in divided societies in the aftermath of violent 
conflict is a central concern for peacebuilding theory and practice. It is a particularly challenging 
problem in cases where there is no clear monopoly of violence, and where there are a 
multiplicity of contending sources of authority. Much of the relevant recent literature that 
addresses this issue is based on case studies where formal governance mechanisms collapsed, 
and where there was a heavy international presence. In contrast, the numerous conflicts that 
take place outside this limelight, such as those in the north-east of India have much to 
contribute to the understanding of this topic, but remain under-studied. Although they bear a 
different set of axioms, policy parameters and historical baggage, the problems that they set 
out to explain are mutually recognisable: the chronic dysfunctionalities of the post-colonial 
state, the challenges in establishing functional and legitimate governance institutions, and the 
relationship between the formal and informal sources of authority. 
 
The 1997 ceasefire between the Indian government and Naga separatist insurgents of the 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) [NSCN-IM] brought a prolonged pause to a 
four decade long violent conflict (Kolås 2011). Although the ceasefire has endured and has 
proven to be effective in bringing down levels of violence, it has not as of yet translated into a 
final political resolution of the conflict. In these circumstances of indefinitely extended 
ambiguity, both sides have established competing civilian governance mechanisms, which has 
as a result created a duplicate set of state institutions in the same territory. Alongside two sets 
of militaries, both sides aspire to provide a range of welfare, security, and representation 
mechanisms, and people can to some extent choose which authority to approach for functions 
such as dispute resolution or criminal justice. 
 
                                                 
1 India had 707 administrative districts as of early 2016. Ukhrul district was sub-divided into Ukhrul and Kamjong in 
late 2016. In this paper we refer to Ukhrul prior to this latest demarcation. 
2 Interview, Kilonser V, 16-05-2016, Ukhrul 
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Many elements of this situation of shared de-facto sovereignty and the prolonged co-existence 
of rival forms of authority are remarkable and unusual, particularly so in the Indian context. 
There is normally no flexibility for the recognition of antagonistic non-state armed groups, 
much less for tolerating explicitly fashioned state institutions that operate inside Indian 
territory, but explicitly outside its constitution. India’s attitude towards ethnic separatist 
insurgencies, particularly in sensitive border areas, is normally uncompromising and 
formalistically Weberian in its ambition. That is, it is based on the overwhelming imperative of 
preserving territorial integrity and regaining the monopoly of violence. The resolution of 
internal conflicts, particularly those involving violent insurgency in the Indian context typically 
amounts to a three part programme of counter-insurgency, economic development schemes, 
and local elections. It is another matter that this approach is often very inadequate in its design 
and implementation, so that it frequently generates perverse, brutal, dysfunctional, and 
counter-productive outcomes. In many cases such as the Manipur valley, this approach actually 
fuelled political instability and violence by creating a system of illegitimate and corrupt elites 
and violent, predatory accumulation.  
 
The Indian government’s approach to the Naga conflict also has to be situated within a larger 
portfolio of overlapping separatist insurgencies and violent ethnic conflicts across India’s 
fractious north-east. (Misra 2014, Nag 2002, Verghese 1996, Baruah 2005, Hazarika 1994, Kolås 
2017). Within just the state of Manipur, there were 25 armed groups as of 2015 under official 
‘Suspension of Operation’ agreements with the government,3 and numerous others in various 
stages of hostilities. In this geographically remote region which is also politically peripheral to 
India’s peninsular core, and which has a distinct ethno-religious composition, anti-state 
insurgencies and inter-ethnic conflicts are often overlapping and interlocking, so that resolving 
one risks aggravating another. Sanjib Baruah well describes this region in terms of a ‘durable 
disorder’, characterised by the presence of ‘ethnic militias, counter-insurgency operations, 
state-backed militias, developmentalist practices, and the deformed institutions of democratic 
governance’ (Baruah 2005:13). These complexities aside, the situation that prevails under the 
Indo-Naga ceasefire, and the possibilities that were hinted at under the hitherto secret August 
2015 ‘framework’ agreement can potentially challenge many of the certitudes that have 
prevailed (Baruah 2017). Given that the Naga conflict is viewed as an ‘umbrella’ movement for 
the numerous ethnic insurgencies in the north-east region, its evolution and the nature of its 
resolution sets a precedent that can have much broader influence.  
 
This paper draws on fieldwork from Ukhrul in the Indian state of Manipur between 2015-17 to 
illustrate how political order is built and sustained under circumstances marked by parallel 
governance institutions established by rival claimants to public authority. We draw on 
interviews, meetings, and interactions with a range of actors in the Indian administration and 
military, local police, senior ministers in the NSCN(IM), civil society activists, NGO workers, and 
other actors, together with supportive evidence from media and documentary sources. We use 
this evidence and draw on the conceptual/theoretical literature on plural political orders as a 
                                                 
3 Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report 2015, p.17. 
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point of departure to explain the contours of this case, and to investigate its consequences. 
Section 2 establishes the conceptual basis of the paper in the contemporary literature on hybrid 
political orders. Section 3 is a brief historical and contextual account of the circumstances 
surrounding the ceasefire. Section 4 is an account of the parallel security situation in Ukhrul 
under the ceasefire. Section 5 is on the civil administration. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Political Order  
The study of political order and the state has been transformed in the context of the ‘new wars’ 
of the 1990s, and the breakdown of state authority in parts of the former Soviet Union, West 
Africa, horn of Africa, Middle East, and South-East Asia. The vast difficulties encountered in 
reconstructing state authority in those areas has fundamentally challenged the Weberian-
Westphalian axioms of statehood and international society, based on the assumptions of 
individual, self-contained, sovereign states, with functional institutions, well demarcated 
borders, culturally homogenous populations, popular legitimacy, and monopolies of violence  
 
In many of the exemplary case studies that populate this literature - Iraq, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Afghanistan, the D.R. Congo - there is a broad consensus that the ‘liberal peacebuilding’ project 
of transforming deeply divided, war-torn societies into modern liberal market democracies 
through the reconstruction of state authority has failed. In attempting to create effective, 
modern state institutions, the project was over-engineered by international technocrats at the 
apex without depth of knowledge about local society, and without an understanding of how 
functional and legitimate states historically evolved into being. As a result, despite the vast 
resources and expert knowledge devoted to them, post-conflict states were invariably 
dysfunctional, lacking the basic criteria for functional statehood with weak legitimacy, 
authority, financial autonomy, or territorial control. They depended on external recognition, 
funding and military support, a factor that reproduced the cycle of fragility and failure.  
 
This experience of disappointment has inspired the rise of a new generation of scholarship 
dedicated to a more organic, grounded understanding of how institutions actually emerge and 
work in practice. As Hagmann and Peclard (2010:546) describe, it represents a ‘more grounded 
approach to statehood whose starting point is empirical and not judicial’. Central to this new 
literature is the recognition that political order is composed of a plurality of sources of 
authority. That is, limiting the analytical and empirical frame to the ‘iceberg view’ of what is 
superficially visible –the juridical formality of the state - is to obscure and ignore the more 
substantial, resonant sources of authority that actually structure society and influence human 
behaviour. The sensibility at work in this new school of thought is captured by the idea of 
‘hybrid political orders’ (Boege et al 2009:17):  
 
diverse and competing authority structures, sets of rules, logics of order, and claims to power 
co-exist, overlap, interact, and intertwine, combining elements of introduced Western models of 
governance and elements stemming from local indigenous traditions of governance and politics, 
with further influences exerted by the forces of globalization and associated societal 
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fragmentation (in various forms: ethnic, tribal, religious). In this environment, the ‘‘state’’ has 
no privileged monopolistic position as the only agency providing security, welfare, and 
representation; it has to share authority, legitimacy, and capacity with other institutions. 
 
Indeed, the preferred concept that is deployed is increasingly this more inherently plural, 
bottom-up optic of ‘political order’, rather than that the monolithic, top-down approach 
contained in the concept of the state.  Political order itself is a term often left undefined, but 
functions as a synonym for structures of political authority and governance, including but not 
restricted to formal state institutions, or as in the case of ‘wartime’ political orders, for a 
military equilibrium.  
 
We define political order here broadly as a system of stable governance of collective social life. 
This refers most fundamentally to the structures that authorise and regulate coercive violence, 
and also beyond that. It is systemic and structural in nature not in the sense that it flows from a 
singular, coherent source or logic of control, and nor does its stability signify rigidity. This 
system can be constituted by a fluid composite of different and even unconnected sources of 
regulatory authority - from formal states and customary law, to religion and ethno-nationalist 
subjectivities. The collective nature of this system means critically that it involves the 
participation of the governed population in the production and sustenance of this order. These 
structures of authority regulate social life through a variety of registers, from violent coercion 
and economic incentives from above and outside, to ideologies of legitimation that work 
through the regulation of the inner self.  
 
Anthropology, with its bottom-up, granular view of the world, and its greater sympathy for a 
pluralist, Foucauldian-informed view of power, has for long been more adept than political 
science at identifying the superficiality and ephemeral nature of formal state institutions, and 
the ways they exist alongside other competing logics of governance. For example, as the 
literature on legal pluralism shows, the formality of European law and private property rights is 
often entirely at odds with alternative forms of customary, culturally resonant structures of law 
and normative rights, such as over land tenure or natural resources (Griffiths 1986, von Benda-
Beckman 1997, Merry 1988).  
 
Similarly, the more ethnographically oriented studies of ‘strong men’, clientelism, neo-
patrimonialism, and the ‘everyday state’, (Erdmann and Engel 2007) have provided 
considerable insight into the ways in which the formal rules-based governance systems contend 
with by other sources of grounded sources of authority and rationalities of governance. The 
growing literature on the ‘local state’ in India has investigated how the state’s juridical 
sovereignty is constantly resisted, constrained and captured from within by what Thomas Blom 
Hansen (2005) describes as ‘sovereigns beyond the state’: the authority of caste, religion, 
patriarchy, customary law, corruption or criminal organisations. For example, Craig Jeffrey’s 
(2000) work on western Uttar Pradesh shows how a dominant land-holding caste community 
was able to use influence in the political hierarchy and local administration to consolidate their 
control. Barbara Harriss-White’s (2003) work on rural markets has described the way caste, 
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gender, religion and other social structures regulate and govern large parts of the economy. 
Paul Brass’s classic study of a communal riot in Uttar Pradesh describes ‘a set of formal rules 
and practices obeyed by a few, a set of informal rules and practices followed by most’ (Brass 
1997: 279).  
 
In contemporary post-conflict societies, this grounded approach to actually existing statehood 
has sought to demonstrate how the apparent disorder and state collapse evident in many 
regions is actually part of the process of reconstituting political order (Peclard and Mechouland 
2015, Tull 2004). Inspired by the historical institutionalist explanations of state-formation in 
early modern Europe, this literature has investigated how governance institutions are formed 
at the crossroads of coercive violence, revenue extraction, and public legitimacy (Reaymaekers 
2014). It has developed concepts such as ‘negotiated statehood’ (Hagmann and Peclard 2009), 
‘shadow states’ (Reno 1999), or ‘twilight institutions’ (Lund 2006). 
 
Our approach to understanding the conditions of the Indo-Naga ceasefire draws on this 
literature, and on the idea of viewing statehood in grounded, empirical terms. We similarly seek 
to understand how these three variables: coercive violence, revenue extraction, and public 
legitimacy are manifest and come together in the circumstances of the Indo-Naga ceasefire. In 
order to do this, we present the material in two layers. Firstly, we examine how coercive 
violence is organised and regulated in terms of the way that the ceasefire works on paper and 
in practice. Secondly, we examine how civilian governance institutions for justice, revenue, and 
public services are organised, and how the two sets of institutions interact. In the course of this, 
we also seek out understandings of how authority is legitimised, and what consequences this 
has. 
 
 
3. Context 
 
INSERT IMAGE 1 (Map of Ukhrul) 
 
The Indo-Naga conflict is the oldest running internal ‘ethnic’ secessionist movement in India, 
dating back to the time of decolonisation in 1947. Space constraints do not permit an adequate 
account of the evolution of Naga identity, the independence movement, and the political 
history, which is well documented, so the focus here is necessarily synoptic. The Nagas, who 
constitute a cluster of some 354 distinct hill peoples straddling the Indo-Myanmar border in the 
Eastern Himalayas (Franke 2012, Shimray 2005, Lintner 2015), and numbering between two and 
three million, have historically resisted incorporation into independent India and have fought 
for self-determination and independence. In this and many other respects, there are important 
parallels to the nearby hill peoples across the Myanmar border, many of whom also fought 
                                                 
4 There are 35 recognised as Scheduled Tribes in India’s 1991 census. There is, however, some ambiguity and fluidity 
in the definition of who constitutes a Naga.  
 7 
separatist insurgencies against the post-colonial state from the time of independence, followed 
by a wave of ceasefires since the 1990s.  
 
As James Scott (2009) describes at length of the ‘Zomia’ region that this terrain naturally falls 
within, the hill/valley divide has historically marked Nagas apart in political, economic, and 
cultural terms from their nearest neighbours in the valleys of Assam and Manipur (Phanjoubam 
2010). The geographical impenetrability of the hills made them difficult to access and govern, 
rendering them, a historically ‘non-state space’. The existence of separate, parallel sources of 
authority in the Naga hills has its provenance in the relationship of the colonial state to Naga 
society. Beyond the nodal points of British control, society was constituted at the level of its 
largely autonomous, self-governing villages within larger tribal identities. In contrast to the 
valleys, the hills were governed by customary law and retained communal forms of land 
ownership to preserve the identity of the hill peoples and protect them from economic 
exploitation. The most significant socio-cultural transformation that took place in this period 
came through the religious conversion of most Nagas to Christianity during the 19th and 20th 
centuries (Thomas 2016). Since independence and the accession of the princely state of 
Manipur to the Indian union, there have been several attempts made by Indian authorities to 
incorporate Naga customary institutions and create devolved institutions of governance for the 
‘scheduled tribes’ of the hills within an overarching Indian governance structure. This has for 
the most part failed because of resistance not just from Nagas, but also from other non-Naga 
hill tribes. 
 
From the mid-1940s, the Naga National Council (NNC) of A.Z. Phizo advocated self-
determination for the Nagas, seeking to avoid an involuntary incorporation into independent 
India. After decolonisation, the NNC rejected the special status and a degree of autonomous 
self-government that the Nagas as ‘scheduled tribes’ were offered under the sixth schedule of 
India’s 1950 constitution. During the 1950's, the NNC escalated the pace of their campaign for 
self-determination by conducting a plebiscite, unilaterally declaring independence, launching a 
boycott of Indian institutions, and promoting a parallel administration based on existing village 
and tribal structures. By the mid-1950s, this campaign had escalated into an increasingly 
militarised confrontation with Indian authorities, who inducted paramilitary forces, and later, 
the army to fight a counter-insurgency (Panwar 2017, Means 1971, Hazarika 1994).  
 
Political negotiations and a ceasefire in the next two decades resulted in a series of compromise 
arrangements whereby the Indian government sought to address Naga aspirations within the 
Indian federal framework. Key among these were the formation of the state of Nagaland in 
1962, and the Shillong Accord in 1975. However, dissatisfaction with the perceived 
inadequacies of these compromises led to a renewal of Naga militancy under the National 
Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). Formed in 1980 by Thuingaleng Muivah, Isak Swi Chu, and 
S.S. Khaplang, the NSCN subsequently split in 1988 into two rival factions, the Isak-Muivah 
group as the dominant group on the Indian side, and the Khaplang group dominant in 
Myanmar. It is in this context that the ceasefire of 1997 with the Isak-Muivah faction brought a 
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pause to the conflict. Effective initially only for a one year period, the ceasefire was 
subsequently renewed annually until 2007, when it was extended indefinitely. 
 
The NSCN (IM) aims to create a state of ‘Nagalim’ or ‘Greater Nagaland’ that includes the 
territory of the present Indian state of Nagaland, along with the neighbouring, Naga populated 
areas in India and Myanmar. In India, alongside parts of the state of Assam and Arunachal 
Pradesh, the most controversial part of the irredentist geography of Nagalim relates to the 
adjoining Naga populated areas in the hills of Manipur. The territorial claim to Nagalim is 
heavily contested by non-Naga groups who fall within its territory. In Manipur, this consists 
primarily of the Meitei people of the Manipur valley and also by other non-Naga hill peoples 
such as the Kukis. The protracted political deadlock in arriving at a final political solution means 
the Indian government and the NSCN(IM) have been trapped in the ambiguities and 
uncertainties of the ceasefire phase for two decades. The process of conflict resolution has 
been suspended for an extended period in this interim stage: a half-way house which is neither 
war nor peace. In the absence of a resolution, the temporary provisions put in place to bring 
about an end to the violence have become a longer term reality. It is in this backdrop that the 
frozen military rivalry between the two sides has been channelled into demonstrative 
performances of expanding and deepening the reach of their civilian administrative institutions.  
 
Of the three Naga-dominated districts in Manipur, Ukhrul has important specificities, and 
stands out for the extent of the NSCN(IM)’s dominance. This means that unlike other parts of 
the ceasefire terrain where control is more fragmented and tenuous due to the presence of 
smaller armed groups, there is here a relatively straight-forward situation with just the state 
and one large non-state armed group to contend with. It is similarly different from the situation 
in the Manipur valley, where there are multiple ‘UGs’ (underground groups) in operation, 
creating a more fragmented and contested terrain - although levels of violence have gradually 
reduced in recent years (Karnad and Jajo 2016, Bhosle 2015). 
 
Ukhrul’s peculiarity in this regard is entirely because it is predominantly populated by a single 
Naga tribe, the Tangkhuls. Tangkhuls comprise over 90 percent of the population, and are 
closely insinuated within the NSCN(IM)’s organisation and hierarchy. The NSCN(IM) leader, 
Thuingaleng Muivah is himself a Tangkhul from Ukhrul, as are a disproportionate share of the 
cadres. The districts of Senapati and Tamenglong also have significant but lesser NSCN(IM) 
influence on the ground, largely because of the greater presence of non-Tangkhul and non-
Naga populations. In that sense, the focus on Ukhrul in this study is not intended to provide a 
representative case of the effects of the ceasefire across its terrain, but an illustrative case of 
the parallel governance system at its most acute. This generates a relatively simpler and more 
stable dyad upon which political order is generated and can be decomposed for analytical 
purposes.  
 
 
4. Security and the Military Equation 
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Carl Schmitt (2007: 52) characteristically notes that ‘no form of order, no reasonable legitimacy 
or legality can exist without protection and obedience’. The regulation of the means of violent 
coercion is a foundational prerequisite for political order, and it assumes paramount 
importance at certain times, such as in the transition out of violent conflict. We thus begin the 
description of the parallel administration system in Ukhrul in terms of security and the military 
equation between the Indian security forces and the NSCN(IM).  
 
What is important to note firstly is that under the ceasefire, the two sides are not 
geographically separated. Apart from a small radius around designated military camps,5 there 
are no ceasefire lines, and no carved out areas of exclusive control to keep the combatants 
apart. The Indian security forces and the NSCN(IM) that they once fought against, are physically 
present alongside one another, cohabiting and exerting their authority over the same heavily 
forested hilly territory and its relatively sparse population. In Staniland (2012)’s typology of 
‘wartime political orders’, this constitutes a relationship of ‘tacit coexistence’ with ‘managed 
expediency’ due to the fragmented control of territory and passive nature of state-insurgent 
cooperation. There is an ‘interweaving of state and non-state violent organizations in the 
context of fragmented, overlapping control’.6  
 
The ceasefire agreement itself has a complicated series of parallel and shadow lives, both 
formal and informal. Firstly, the applicability of the ceasefire itself is a matter of much 
controversy. In de jure terms, the agreement is applicable only in the state of Nagaland, and 
not in Manipur, although there is an implicit understanding that it is actually in effect 
throughout the region. In practice, this means that it has been successful insofar as it has 
brought a sustained pause to the violent conflict, although this is not immediately apparent, 
because the security situation on the ground is often tenuous and prone to crisis. There is a 
constant stream of shootings, abductions, assaults, mass actions and strikes in and around 
Ukhrul town. Senior government officials have on more than one occasion had their cars set on 
fire, while the Chief Minister of Manipur’s helicopter was shot at in October 2016. The main 
road arteries in the district, leading to Imphal or Dimapur are often blockaded and shut down 
by armed groups or demonstrations. Commercial enterprises and traffic are routinely subject to 
‘taxation’ by armed groups, and suffer punishment if they fail to pay.  
 
This reality notwithstanding, there has, since the high point of the mid-1990s, been a 
considerable reduction in the incidence of violence. Even when it does not technically apply in 
Manipur, the ceasefire agreement provides a set of clear ground rules of conduct: both sides 
are committed to ending offensive operations against one another, and to take measures to 
prevent accidental violations from escalating. There is a ceasefire monitoring board composed 
of five representatives from either side, with a chairman appointed by the Indian government. 
The conditions under which this co-existence occurs is very significant to note: the ceasefire 
                                                 
5 Because of the ambiguous and controversial applicability of the ceasefire outside Nagaland, designated NSCN(IM) 
camps in Manipur are properly referred to as ‘taken note of’ camps. 
6 It should be noted that we differ in this regard from Staniland’s own categorisation of the Indo-Naga case within 
his matrix, which he finds to be a case of ‘spheres of influence’ arising from segmented control.  
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agreement is not just a standstill between two equals, as the balance of restrictions in the rules 
are clearly in favour of the Indian side.  
 
While the Indian security forces are committed to ‘not cause harassment/damage or loss of 
property or injury to the civilian population’, the NSCN(IM) has more onerous conditions, and is 
confined to a series of designated camps between which movements are restricted and 
controlled. They are furthermore required by the ground rules to desist from aiding other 
insurgent organisations, to end extortion (taxation), forced recruitment, or disrupting transport 
routes or government development projects. In other words, the agreement aspires to 
establish a system whereby the Indian state is clearly the dominant authority, preserving de 
jure and de facto control of the territory at large, while permitting the NSCN(IM) a peaceful, but 
carefully controlled, limited existence.  
 
In practice, though, the realities on the ground are more relaxed and flexible than those in 
print. Its provisions are routinely subverted, and the Indian security forces appear to tolerate 
this. In Manipur, as in Nagaland, the NSCN(IM) is able to fluidly project coercive authority well 
beyond the bounds of its camps, often very openly and without challenge - although it is careful 
to calibrate that within a set of invisible red lines. With an estimated 5,000 armed cadres, and 
as an organisation that remains primarily military in its outlook and organisation, the NSCN(IM) 
is very aware that the political space and authority that it enjoys under the ceasefire derives 
ultimately from military strength, and from projecting a credible latent capacity to return to 
war. Consequently, military preparedness and coercion continue to play an important part for 
the NSCN(IM) both internally and externally. Internally, it serves to reinforce the NSCN(IM)’s 
pre-eminent position within Naga society, vis-à-vis rivals such as the Khaplang faction, giving it 
the authority to negotiate a political agreement with India. It provides the NSCN(IM) with the 
basis to assert domination over Naga society, wield control of a wider set of Naga customary 
institutions and civil society organisations, and also to enforce revenue collection such as tolls 
and taxes.  
 
Externally, coercive violence serves largely to confront and contain rival organisations, to 
protect important sources of revenue, or to protect Naga villages against non-Nagas. For 
example, despite the heavy presence of Indian security forces in the area, it is the NSCN(IM) 
that is widely expected to keep Ukhrul safe from attacks by valley-based groups, and this 
expectation was shared even by members of the Indian administration.7 Following a series of 
bomb blasts in civilian areas of Ukhrul in September and November 2014, the NSCN(IM) was 
reputed to have tracked down and dispensed retribution to the perpetrators.  
 
The Indian security forces seek to contain the NSCN(IM) to some extent, by maintaining a 
significant presence to monitor unauthorised movements, disrupt tax collection, and prevent 
the NSCN(IM) from establishing new camps. This task is primarily the responsibility of the army, 
and more often, the paramilitary Assam Rifles, rather than the state police force. However, the 
                                                 
7 Interview, Government Official, 15-05-2016, Ukhrul 
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larger prerogative that both sides share of preserving the ceasefire means that there are limits 
even to covert and indirect forms of warfare, and a clear mutual sense of what constitutes 
permissible conduct. In practice, both sides observe a considerable degree of pragmatic 
tolerance and self-restraint, although these boundaries are constantly tested.  
 
These unwritten rules are also more flexible, and can, within limits, change from one setting to 
another across the ceasefire terrain. For example, Indian security forces are more permissive of 
NSCN(IM) activity in Ukhrul, and less so elsewhere. An Indian military official described the 
calculation: ‘It is totally different how we deal [with the NSCN(IM)] in Tamenglong (another 
district in Manipur with a Naga presence) and here. Here [Ukhrul] there is no other group. In 
Tamenglong, we see that they stay divided’.8 That is, whereas the rules dictate that NSCN(IM) 
cadres in uniform and bearing arms outside designated camps are to be arrested, this rarely 
happens, and NSCN(IM) cadres are often on patrol in the open. Indian security forces on active 
patrol often inform the NSCN(IM) in order to avoid a confrontation, and local commanders 
keep in contact with their counterparts.9 
 
In place of open confrontation, the contention between the two sides is instead pursued by 
other vicarious means such as covert attacks and indirect war through proxies. The NSCN(IM) 
has historically provided support, including weapons, to other separatist groups fighting the 
India state in the northeast, while the Indian intelligence services are reputed to promote rival 
militant organisations who undermine and attack the NSCN(IM). But even more importantly, 
the deployment of coercive authority takes place not solely through military violence, but 
through civilian force multipliers. In Ukhrul, where civilian support for the NSCN(IM) is 
widespread and deep, considerable pressure can be exerted through organised mass action. 
That is, Naga civil society organisations such as the Naga Student Federation or the United Naga 
Council (UNC) - are able to exert significant non-military coercive pressure, sometimes with 
devastating effectiveness through strikes and road blockades. Between November 2016 - 
March 2017 these groups brought the Manipur valley to a standstill with a four month blockade 
of the main road artery that connects the valley to the rest of India, triggering widespread 
shortages of fuel and many essential commodities. While these actions are often evidently set 
in motion and calibrated by the NSCN(IM) itself, the extent to which their coercive reach is 
conducted at arm’s length, and through other organisations is testament to the broader reach 
and control that the organisation is able to exert. 
 
In sum, the military equation between the two sides is contained under the ceasefire, but it 
retains a certain element of fluidity even so. The formal military standstill is, within limits, 
undermined and subverted by the covert projection of military power, but also through the 
overt projection of non-military coercive power. For this reason, the political order that has 
emerged under the ceasefire is a function not just of the de jure military standstill that is 
                                                 
8 Interview, Indian military officer, 25-03-2017, Ukhrul 
9 Emblematic of this is an Assam Rifles officer we interviewed who candidly described how he often crossed paths 
with the NSCN(IM) while both sides were on patrol, and had developed a rapport with his opposite number. 
Interview, Assam Rifles officer, 25-03-2017, Ukhrul  
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formally delineated, but also of the more complex de facto arrangements of the way coercive 
authority has come to be deployed under it. 
 
 
5. Civil Administration 
 
After the 1997 ceasefire, we function openly. We have been running the government in 26 regions. All cases were 
brought to the GPRN. All disputes: village, individuals, all courts are Naga. No one goes to India. We settle the 
disputes - Kilo Kilonser (Home Minister) NSCN-IM.10 
 
The Indian governance structure in Ukhrul follows the standardised template that is common to 
district level administration through the rest of the country. Headed by a career civil servant of 
the rank of District Commissioner (DC), the administration is responsible for a range of 
functions, including law and order, development schemes, and revenue. Law and order is 
provisioned through five police stations in Ukhrul headed by a Superintendent of Police, and 
staffed with 200 police personnel (Statistical yearbook of Ukhrul 2014). The district 
administration coordinates with central and state level ministries and departments on a wide 
range of functions such as elections, policing, public health, education, irrigation, rural 
development, and other welfare schemes. Beyond these, the Indian administration and the 
related public sector bodies also serve another important function as the most important 
source of formal sector employment in an area where education levels are rising but the formal 
private sector has a weak presence. Related to this, the steady flow of government contracts 
and their multiplier effects also constitute the most important source of private sector 
accumulation and employment. The Indian state as such, encompasses the lives of people in 
Ukhrul in multiple dimensions through a well funded, staffed, and multi-faceted machinery of 
governance.  
 
The NSCN(IM)’s administration at the district level is, just as with the Indian system, a 
component of a larger multi-level hierarchy of governance across the terrain of control claimed 
as the Naga homeland or Nagalim. At the apex of the structure is the executive, composed of 
the prime minister, who is the NSCN(IM)’s general secretary, Thuingaleng Muivah. The prime 
minister is in charge of four major ministries (Defence, Home, Finance and Foreign Affairs) that 
sits alongside a legislative body, the Tatar Hoho. Administration is devolved into 26 regions, 
each of which is headed by an executive Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and a local 
legislature or Leacy. In functional terms, the CAO of Ukhrul is the counterpart to the Indian 
system’s District Commissioner, and has responsibility for local policing and justice based on 
customary law. According to a budget plan presented for the entire organisation, The 
NSCN(IM)’s overall budget, including civilian and military operations for all its areas of control is 
Rs 170 Cr for 2016-17, (approximately US$25 million).11 
                                                 
10 Interview, Rh Raising, 21-06-2016, Dimapur, Nagaland 
11 Sudeep Chakravarty (2016) A Rebel Needs a Cause and Budget. Livemint. 29 September 2016. Downloaded from: 
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/oEGSnUNKORezAQl8sDGrcI/A-rebel-needs-a-cause-and-
budget.html#.WRMylskmS1Y.email on 22 November 2016. 
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While the present system of parallel governance in Ukhrul has emerged under the protracted 
ceasefire, the origins and basis of the NSCN(IM)’s civilian administration lie in the longer history 
of the Naga movement for self-determination and independent statehood since 1947. The Naga 
National Council (NNC) that initially led the independence movement in the 1940s was 
composed as a federation of tribal councils, and was as such built on the existing structure of 
customary village governance at the time. The NNC leader A.Phizo declared independent 
statehood, boycotting Indian institutions, including elections, and launching an armed struggle. 
The subsequent generation of Naga activists from the 1960s moved beyond the customary 
framework to articulate a modern constitution with a pan-Naga governance structure, the 
Yezhabo, which continues to be the framework around which the present structure of the 
NSCN(IM)’s administration is based. 
 
In other words, the assertion of statehood and governance institutions has for long been an 
important component of the contestation for power, and predates the 1997 ceasefire. 
However, the ceasefire and the cessation of violence has generated the opportunity for these 
institutions to function, expand their reach, and to evolve with respect to Indian governance 
structures. As the GPRN’s Kilo Kilonser explained, ‘during the struggling period, we had a civil 
setup, but it did not openly function’.12 In contrast to the more loosely strung structure of 
governance of the early NNC years based largely on the existing village units, the NSCN(IM) has 
advanced a set of modern, centralised, pan-Naga governing institutions staffed with 
functionaries, that draw in, yet supersede and transcend customary village and tribal-based 
institutions. 
 
  
CHART 1 
 
There remains widespread feeling among Nagas that their incorporation into India was 
involuntary, illegitimate, and very brutal, and that Indian institutions are an unwelcome alien 
imposition to be rejected, or at best, to be pragmatically endured. In contrast, the NSCN(IM)’s 
institutions inspire a patriotic reverence as the expression of a hard-fought struggle for 
independence that brought nationalist aspirations for self-rule to fruition. Moreover, NSCN(IM) 
institutions are valued because they are local, accessible, staffed by Nagas, and organically 
connected to customary institutions. As a Naga civil society worker explained, the NSCN(IM) 
builds on the values of collectivism of traditional Naga institutions and is seen as an extension 
of the same.13 This view was also reiterated by an officer of the Indian State, who candidly 
admitted that ‘We [the Indian administrative system] are the anomaly here.’14 
 
                                                 
12 Interview, Rh Raising, 21-06-2016, Dimapur, Nagaland 
13 Interview, NPHMR member 16-05-2016, Ukhrul 
14 Interview, Government Official, 15-05-2016, Ukhrul 
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At the same time, the NSCN(IM)’s support and legitimacy are not absolute, but also have limits 
that are being tested as the ceasefire drags on. As the organisation has extended its spheres of 
control, it has also come under a growing tide of criticism from within Naga society. In our 
interviews, we were able to detect a level of resentment directed particularly at two elements: 
the widespread taxation system and the culture of military authoritarianism. While the 
NSCN(IM) views their de-facto government as having a legitimate right to levy tax’, (and the Kilo 
Kilonser described how ‘no one refuses to pay’,15) our interviews in Ukhrul suggest that there 
are tensions where the NSCN(IM) asks for extra taxes, particularly where this involves 
intimidation. One interviewee in Ukhrul described, ‘In the 1980s and early 1990s, the IM had 
absolute respect. After the ceasefire, when they entered the contract business, they have lost 
legitimacy. Now obedience comes because they have guns.’16 An NGO worker in Ukhrul 
described how ‘people cannot voice their dissent because the IM are armed’.17 Under these 
circumstances, there are a range of alternative voices and organisations that have emerged 
from within Naga society, particularly in nearby Nagaland, that have openly challenged the 
NSCN(IM) over issues ranging from women’s representation and natural resource rights, to 
greater accountability.  
 
In formal terms, the Indian government and NSCN(IM)’s civilian administration systems do not 
mutually recognise one another or have any nodes of connection. People in Ukhrul negotiate 
the existence of two different systems on a daily basis, and can in some cases opt for one over 
the other. The two sides have separate offices, albeit close to one another in Ukhrul town, but 
are derived from distinct histories, cultures, and rules of operation. There are in addition, large 
differences in their capacities, funding, and functions, so that they craft the form and content of 
governance in distinct ways. Both systems provide security through their military and police 
services, as well as forms of representation and judicial institutions. But most public services 
and social welfare beyond that, such as health, education, or employment schemes, are 
provided only by the Indian institutions, who fund these activities not on local taxes, but on a 
sizeable volume of fiscal transfers from the central treasury in New Delhi. 
 
This is to some extent a challenge to the broader idea of contractarian legitimacy contained for 
example in Mampilly (2011), through which the authority to rule by non-state armed groups 
becomes legitimised and consensual through the provision of public services. Here instead, the 
model appears to be inverted because the NSCN(IM) clearly has deep public support and 
legitimacy without providing any services, while the Indian government, which does provide 
services, evidently lacks that legitimacy. This is not to suggest that service provision or 
legitimacy are irrelevant issues here, but the causal link between them is more complex and 
needs further investigation. In Nandini Sundar’s research on the similar juncture between the 
Indian and the Maoist authorities in central India, she describes how ‘Forced to choose, the 
poorer people across villages say they prefer the Maoist state but with a real sense of regret at 
                                                 
15 Ibid 
16 Interview, student union member, 16-05-2016, Ukhrul 
17 Interview, NGO worker, 24-03-2017, Ukhrul 
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the government funds they are forced to forgo’ (Sundar 2014:477). There are also insights into 
this paradox provided in Suykens (2015) comparison of the governance forms of the NSCN(IM) 
to those of the Maoist insurgency in central India. He finds that Naga rebels, who base their 
authority on ethnicity, extended security only to co-ethnics, expected all Nagas to pay taxes, 
and to submit to them. In contrast, the Maoists in central India, who lacked the concreteness of 
an ethnic link, were far more cautious in their governance, provided social services, and had to 
‘earn’ the support of the people.  
 
The NSCN(IM)’s approach to establishing its authority through civilian governance lies not in 
mirroring and competing with the far better funded Indian system. Instead it has a three-fold 
strategy that is able to maximise its presence drawing on widespread public support, depth of 
penetration into society, and the ability to project considerable coercive pressure. Firstly, in 
some spheres, such as security, policing, or taxation, there is an entirely parallel structure that 
is staffed and operated directly by cadres of the NSCN(IM). In Ukhrul, the Indian (Manipur 
state) police force is mirrored by the NSCN(IM)’s ‘Town Command’, an alternative police force 
of 25 staff. Town Command is widely considered more effective and accessible than the Indian 
(Manipur) police force. As one informant described ‘you just give them a call, no formal 
complaint required.’18 A senior Indian police official also confirmed that most people in Ukhrul 
would use Town Command over the police.19 At the same time, this reputation for efficiency 
can amount to more summary and brutal forms of punishment, and people weigh issue when 
making decisions on who to approach. A Tangkhul Students Union member in Ukhrul who 
would normally call the Town Command in most cases, explained how in one instance which 
involved minors, he chose to call the police instead, because ‘the Town Command can be a bit 
rough’.20 
 
The GPRN also has an extensive, and autonomous revenue collection system which sustains the 
organisation. In contrast to the Indian institutions, which depend largely on transfers, the 
revenue for the GPRN is raised locally, based on taxing revenue from households, commerce, 
employees, and government contracts. It is widely known that Naga salaried employees pay 
two percent of their salary (see image 2) and most village households pays a flat 250 Rupees. 
Image 4 is an official receipt acknowledging that five percent of the value of a government 
infrastructure contract was paid as tax to the NSCN(IM). 
 
Secondly, there are other areas of governance where the NSCN(IM) does not directly establish 
institutions, but draws on, co-opts, and dominates existing Naga customary institutions and civil 
society organisations. In terms of land transactions, justice, and dispute resolution, the 
NSCN(IM) governs by connecting its institutions of policing with existing customary institutions, 
and this is the process that most people in Ukhrul will opt for over the Indian court system. 
Village and tribal justice institutions are hierarchically organised into an overarching structure, 
                                                 
18 Interview, civil society member, 16-05-2016, Ukhrul 
19 Interview, senior police officer, 17-05-2016, Ukhrul 
20 Interview, student union member, 16-05-2016, Ukhrul 
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(see chart 2) at the apex of which lies the NSCN(IM)’s own supreme oversight body, the 
National Judicial Body (NJB). An Indian official described: 
 
First they (the people of Ukhrul) would go to the village authorities as a first court. Then they 
would go to the TNL [Tangkhul Naga Long] or IM [NSCN(IM)], there is not much difference 
between them. If this doesn’t work, they come to us [the Indian institutions] as a last resort.21 
 
 
INSERT CHART 2 
 
In addition to the judicial system, the NSCN(IM) also wields strong influence in a range of other 
civic and tribal organisations, such as the Tangkhul Naga Long (TNL), along with women’s and 
student organizations. The NSCN(IM) greatly influences the decisions and functioning of most 
Naga customary and civil society organizations, to the extent that they serve to extend and 
amplify the organisation’s voice and reach deep within society. This influence is often voluntary, 
and many are openly sympathetic to the NSCN(IM). However, the mechanisms of cooption and 
control can often be very coercive. In one particularly shocking case in 2013, the NSCN(IM) 
killed Jonathan Kashung, the front-runner in the election to the presidency of an important 
tribal body, the Tangkhul Naga Long (TNL), allowing their preferred candidate, Artax Shimray to 
win.  
 
Thirdly, in other areas, including public service provision and welfare, the NSCN(IM) extends its 
authority over civilian governance indirectly, by influencing or even gaining control over parts 
of the Indian political and governance structure. This occurs on the one hand through 
influencing elections and exerting pressure on Naga elected representatives to the state 
Legislative Assembly and Autonomous Development Council (ADC), so that they act in 
accordance with the organisation’s directives. On the other hand, influence over governance is 
also exerted through pressure over the Indian government’s administration officials, primarily 
to direct the flow of contracts and resources.  
 
In Ukhrul, more so than other areas, the NSCN(IM) is able to direct what government schemes 
are to be implemented, where, and most importantly, by which contractor. The Kilo Kilonser 
elaborated that ‘state employees, MLA’s and MP’s need to be with us as we are the people’s 
government. If they are not, we need to change it. They have to pay loyalty to the GPRN.’22 
While influence over the administration is most effective with lower level officials, who are 
mostly Tangkhuls from Ukhrul, the NSCN(IM) also exerts pressure on senior officials, who are 
mostly not Nagas. Indeed, Indian bureaucrats who are found to be uncooperative in this regard 
have been pressured to leave Ukhrul and seek a transfer, and one recent DC was even being 
forced to flee in secret due to the threat to his life.  
 
                                                 
21 Interview, senior police officer, 17-05-2016, Ukhrul 
22 Interview, Rh Raising, 21-06-2016, Dimapur, Nagaland 
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The NSCN(IM) influences and even explicitly directs the award of government contracts by 
issuing recommendation letters. Image 3 is a copy of one such letter of recommendation, 
directing the district administration to award the construction work on a cement footpath to a 
particular contractor. The recommendation is worded as ‘binding and final’, and to be treated 
as ‘top priority without any changes’. On most infrastructure projects like this, the tax is five 
percent, and is transparently accounted for, with official receipts provided as proof of payment. 
Image 4 shows a receipt issued by the NSCN(IM) from the contractor of a Border Area 
Development Programme (BADP) project. With flagship welfare schemes like the national rural 
employment guarantee scheme (NREGS), the tax collected from the various parties can be as 
much as 20 percent of the total funds. 
 
This form of taxation is not restricted to Ukhrul or the NSCN(IM): government contracts 
routinely attract demands for ‘tax’ by armed groups in the rest of Manipur and the north-east. 
Outside Ukhrul, and in places where there are rival armed groups, competition over the control 
of this lucrative source of revenue is fierce, and leads to violent clashes. Paradoxically, this 
process of predatory rent extraction is fuelled by the high volume of fiscal transfers from New 
Delhi, the intended purpose of which is to use economic resources to diminish the underlying 
causes of conflict. By constructing infrastructure projects, implementing welfare schemes, and 
providing government employment, the underlying motive of the Indian government is to 
generate bonds of economic linkage and contractarian legitimacy to counteract the weak 
loyalty that many feel to India. However, in practice, it appears to do the reverse, and fuels 
violence, and in the case of Ukhrul, forms a substantial part of the revenue base that the 
NSCN(IM) uses to maintain a parallel governance structure.  Despite the constant flow of funds, 
the Indian administration in Ukhrul is often viewed as a barely tolerated outsider. As one 
informant in the administration described:  
 
People do not view this as their government. They look at the government just as a source of 
money. It comes along with no obedience, no loyalty. They pay no taxes and they do not 
consider us theirs.23 
 
 
6. Implications and Conclusions 
This paper has drawn on evidence from Ukhrul in the Indian state of Manipur to explain how 
political order has taken form in the aftermath of a lengthy period of insurgent conflict. Under 
the Indo-Naga ceasefire, the two contending parties have, in addition to a regulated military co-
existence, constructed a parallel system of institutions to exert governing authority over the 
civilian population. Political order is not monopolised by any one single governing authority, but 
is, as Boege et al (2009) described, a ‘hybrid’ between the two.  
 
Upon closer inspection, this hybrid arrangement is composed of three distinct levels of 
interaction. Firstly, one category of structures (primarily security) is parallel and coordinated. 
                                                 
23 Interview, government official, 15-05-2016, Ukhrul 
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There are matching pairs of institutions which are mutually recognised under the written 
agreement, with oversight, monitoring, and restraint to regulate and preserve that 
separateness. Secondly, there is a set that are parallel but uncoordinated - such as the judiciary, 
and police. That is, there are competing pairs of institutions, but there is no formal recognition, 
or much informal interaction between the two sides. People can to some extent choose 
between the two. Thirdly, there is a category of governance institutions and practices where 
the presence is one-sided, and where the other lacks a commensurate counterpart. Indian 
institutions provide a range of services that has no parallel equivalent, but they nevertheless 
come under the substantial influence of the NSCN(IM), which is able to direct and control many 
of their activities and spending.  
 
What is it that can be concluded from this layered reality and what are its likely consequences 
for conflict resolution? There are two ways in which this the trajectory of this co-existence can 
be understood and interpreted.  
 
On the one hand, it can be viewed in terms of the dysfunctionality of the outcome and the 
separateness of its parts. Under the protracted ceasefire and the parallel system that it has 
spawned, the conflict has remained frozen, irresolute, contentious, and heavily militarised. The 
Indian government is unable to secure a monopoly on violence and to effectively enforce the 
provisions of its own ceasefire. New Delhi’s steady supply of funds and provision of services 
fails to buy legitimacy, but may actually serve to undermine its authority and sustain a parallel 
system. The NSCN(IM) in contrast, enjoys significant public legitimacy but is largely dependent 
on taxing the flow of funds provided by the Indian government for its sustenance, and is as 
such, also constrained and lacks autonomy. The necessary constituent elements of state 
formation: the control of violence, economic activity, and legitimacy, fail to come together in 
the body of any one authority but are haphazardly shared between two entities that 
deliberately keep a distance from one another. This creates a schizophrenic and incoherent 
political order that is frequently prone to breakdown. 
 
On the other hand, there is a different, more forgiving explanation that is available by viewing 
institutional co-existence in its totality, as an evolving, productive system. The answer to the 
apparent contradiction between the Indian government’s provision of services and the 
NSCN(IM)’s enduring legitimacy may be that they should be seen not as separate state entities, 
but as component parts of an improvised, interlocking, evolving whole. The presence of 
nominally separate and rival forms of authority belies the fact that they do not just co-exist but 
actually cohere, albeit with many problems, to piece together a system of order in which 
capital, coercion, and charisma are imperfectly brought together.  
 
As Vanderkerckove (2011: 763) describes, the Indian government’s Weberian ambition belies 
the fact that ‘the state lacked de facto sovereign control in major parts of Northeast India’. Both 
in Manipur and elsewhere, substantial authority has for long been ceded to localised autocrats 
as part of a bargain to limit anti-government violence and to preserve the larger structure of 
Indian rule (Lacina 2009). As Sanjib Baruah (2009:3) describes: ‘for the moment, in a region that 
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is peripheral to the national imaginary, the costs of letting low-intensity conflicts proliferate and 
fester are seen as affordable’. 
 
The NSCN(IM)’s ability to tax and influence the spending and services funded by the Indian 
government means that it serves as the entity that can enable and activate public access to 
those services. The challenge of doing so successfully requires it to have the ability to sustain 
two distinct forms of legitimacy. The first is based on identity and military capacity: it is the 
legitimacy that derives from being an authentic representative and protagonist of Naga identity 
and aspirations, from being a vibrant force of resistance to the Indian state. The second is a 
more contractarian form of legitimacy that derives from the ability to act as the gatekeeper 
that enables people to access the services and material benefits of the same state: 
employment, infrastructure, poverty alleviation schemes. As Lund (2006:689) describes, their 
‘public authority seems to manifest itself in an ambiguous process of being and opposing the 
state’. 
 
Their ambitions of separate statehood aside, the NSCN(IM)’s participation in a cohering system 
of political order is not dissimilar to the way that numerous former separatist rebels and ethnic 
militia leaders in other parts of the north-east operate. Using their ethnic credentials, 
organisational links, funding from the centre, and coercive power, former insurgents have over 
time become part of the structure of ‘legal’ electoral politics within the Indian federal system. 
This is not to predict that the NSCN(IM) will eventually embrace this outcome formally, but that 
the de facto practice and the way they manipulate Indian state institutions already resembles 
this. Indeed, even beyond the north-east, many elements of Ukhrul’s parallel governance have 
a family resemblance to the way that parochial sources of local authority across India, such as 
caste, compete with the state from the outside, while simultaneously capturing and corrupting 
it from the inside. As Hansen (2005: 191) describes, de facto sovereignty in India is not a 
monopoly, but is more broadly shared: ‘the right and the capacity to make decisions, to 
adjudicate, to govern, and even to kill and punish, historically has been distributed between a 
range of authorities and institutions in India’. 
 
Under the ceasefire, and with the passive participation of the Indian authorities, the NSCN(IM) 
has occupied a space that leverages its military capacities and wide following in Naga society to 
fold in customary institutions and authority, and to channel and command the financial 
resources of the Indian state. In doing so, political order under the ceasefire has been forged in 
terms of the way this this wide gap between the modern centralised state and the Nagas who 
historically lived in a ‘non-state space’ has been bridged. This does not mean that it is a 
satisfactory outcome for either side, but that the whole needs to be viewed differently from the 
frustrated ambitions of its constituent parts. 
 
Which of these two interpretations is more accurate? In many ways, this the same question 
posed in evaluating other post-conflict territories such as Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Are the fragile, unstable and contested governance authorities that emerge 
in these territories to be understood as having failed for producing dysfunctional and weak 
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formal state institutions? Or are they 'work in progress' arrangements evolving into shape 
between plural sources of authority that are learning painfully how to live together?  Is 
instability, violence, and corruption evidence of failure? Or is to be viewed as a preferred 
alternative to war, and a necessary transitional step in the long and non-linear path to stable 
political order?  
 
In the Indo-Naga ceasefire, as in the cases such as Afghanistan, the evidence available to judge 
between these two possible explanations is ambiguous and contradictory. The situation 
remains tentative, and prone to numerous contingencies and unpredictable outside influences 
that can lead it in different directions. Many of the very confident evaluations and categorical 
assertions of the one or the other are in reality speculative, and based on the premature 
interpretation of inconclusive and fragmentary evidence. If a functional political order is indeed 
evolving organically, then it is inching forward very slowly. This is perhaps to be expected given 
that the area has historically been a 'non-state' space, and the time that has elapsed under the 
ceasefire is brief in comparison.  
 
In the meanwhile, there is a third explanation that sits astride and accommodates both 
functionality and dysfunctionality. That is, there is a deadlocked process of conflict resolution 
and persistent failure because it forms a stable equilibrium in its own right, in which there are 
many beneficiaries. As David Keen (2006) explains, violence and disorder are not simply 
irrational failures but have a logic of their own, and serve the interests of those who perpetuate 
it. The prolonged period of uncertainty in the Indo-Naga ceasefire persists because its key 
stake-holders either benefit directly from it, or find the alternative too costly – in political, 
military or economic terms, to contemplate. At one level, the ceasefire and the parallel system 
has empowered and enriched a range of actors at different levels. At another level, any 
negative evaluation of the dysfunctionalities of the parallel system will have to bear in mind the 
reality that the conflict is deadlocked into a mutually configured dead-end. The impossibility of 
resolving the multi-sided nature of the conflict and the zero-sum territorial equation between 
the Nagas and the Meiteis means that the only counter-factual reality may be a return to 
violence and an end to what is for some, a relatively comfortable and lucrative co-existence. 
The ambiguities of the ceasefire, and the multiple layers of de jure versus de facto versions of 
reality that it sustains, provide a face-saving device that can be used creatively by all sides to 
maintain stability by promoting a set of useful fictions. For the Nagas, it is the fiction that they 
have a state and self-governing territory which will eventually become sovereign. For the 
Meiteis, it is the fiction that they have preserved the borders of their state. For the Indian 
government, it is the fiction that they have control and govern throughout the territory of India.  
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